The Courage to Create Change: An Ike's Perceptions of Navigation Maintenance Policy
By Barry Drazkowski
This is a big topic and is difficult to enter as my mind relives the ongoing controversies and confrontations around expanding commercial navigation dating back to the 1970s, building in intensity until the Corps released their draft navigation report during the late ‘90s. Prior to this in the early ‘80s, the Master Planning and Great River Environmental Action Team (GREAT), where river managers, including the Corps, addressed the standard process of side casting dredged material in the dredged area. This practice established the sandbar sites so common up and down the river so popular with river recreationists. Some of these persist today and are the sought after sites for river boaters. However, the consequence of this practice was the erosion and transport of dredge material, typically sand, into the adjacent backwaters. This happened at alarming rates with more and more backwaters in the mid pool reaches filling with sandbars and sand-filled channels. Those studies recommended the new practice of placing the dredged sand in containment areas built in the area of dredged sites. Many of us referred to these sites as ‘bathtubs,’ given they were large diked areas in which the dredge material was placed. Several of these sites had access and the material began being used for road sand during the winter. The corps dubbed this “beneficial use” and it was/is. However, this plan had a 50-year life expectancy due to the capacity of the “bathtubs.” At the time we all believed the problem was fixed, benefits realized, and everyone patted themselves on the back for a job well done.
Then I’m reminded of the recent Navigation and Ecosystem Sustainability Program (NESP), to appropriate funds to selected navigation and ecosystem restoration items originally described in the navigation report. If you remember, NESP was created following the massive embarrassment the Corps suffered following the whistle blower report issued by Don Sweeney in February 2000. He was an economist working on the Corps navigation studies economic value of navigation. Mr. Sweeney’s report documented the Corps false statements as to the economic value of navigation. He stated the Corps directed the economists to make navigation look economically beneficial, saying the benefit cost ratio was 1:1 when in reality the economist determined it was 0.2:1. This scandal resulted in Federal investigations, convening the National Science panel to evaluate this situation, and eventually resulted in the Corps offering up a new vision for navigation expansion—a vision that promised ecological restoration on equal footing to dollars spent on navigation, literally one dollar for navigation and one dollar for ecosystem. Well, the environmental community rallied around this proposal believing that the Corps and conservation community had finally come to terms with the river’s value and future—that a billion dollars would be spent and river habitat restoration would finally be at par with the proposed navigation expansion. And in 2006 Congress passed the bill, but did not authorize any funding until recently. I’m proud to add that at that time the only NGO that said no to supporting this proposal was the Izaak Walton League of America.
And here we are, almost 50 years later, the bathtubs are full, and disposal now is now once again a problem of where to put it. The Corps and river managers have devised a limited working solution where part of the material is being used in habitat restoration. For island building projects, river sand makes a great base for construction. Yes, they still need a healthy dose of organic sediment on top to facilitate plant community growth, but it has worked up and down the river. However, now that disposal sites are filling or are full, there seems to be a concerning change. More frequently we hear dredged material being called beneficial. We see the navigation maintenance portion of NESP, now linked to ecosystem restoration, so maintenance dredging can more easily be linked to providing sand for backwater projects. Again, it sounds good on the surface, but let's be cautious. Can we really restore pool islands and their dead forests in Pool No. 9 by dumping dredged sand on them and then planting trees? Can we restore lost habitat by using dredged sand instead of addressing the problems of sedimentation, lost hydrologic functions, and lost connectivity of backwaters to the river. Are we once again putting navigation and its management before ecosystem restoration? This raises an important and serious question.
Is ongoing navigation management of the 9-foot channel putting the multi-billion dollar river recreation industry at risk? Is it trading off ancient river habitat and geomorphology for places to dump dredged river sand? Are we trading off all that we cherish in what the river was, what it is today, and how it is diminishing into the future, for a navigation management strategy that has a benefit cost ratio of .2, where it returns to the public $2 for every $10 in taxed dollars spent on maintaining the 9-foot navigation channel? Or is there an alternative?
Could we modify current policy to consider using the river’s own flow to manage backwater sedimentation and restore lost hydrology? The fundamental flaw in our current management approach is that we remain trapped in a reactive loop: we treat the river as a static industrial canal that must be dredged, diked, and capped with artificial islands just to handle the endless fallout of navigation maintenance. Calling every bit of dredged sand "beneficial use" doesn't change the underlying reality—it simply shifts the cost of channel maintenance onto the ecosystem restoration budget. Island building and tree planting both have their place, but they cannot replace the ancient geomorphology and natural sediment transport systems we have disrupted.
A true future for a healthy Upper Mississippi requires a shift from sand disposal to hydraulic restoration. To get there, policy within the Corps and regional river management must evolve in three critical ways:
Ecosystem Restoration Must Stand on Its Own Feet: NESP funding and habitat projects must not be constrained to where the Corps needs to dump sand. Ecosystem restoration must be driven by ecological priorities—restoring historic flow regimes, backwater depth, and floodplain forest hydrology—not channel dredging logistics.
Harnessing River Energy for Sediment Management: Instead of relying indefinitely on mechanical dredging and full "bathtubs," river management policy must prioritize systemic closing structure modifications. Strategic notchings, wing dam realignments, and controlled flow reintroductions can use the river’s natural energy to flush fine sediment, prevent backwater choking, and re-establish seasonal connectivity.
Redefining the Public Return on Investment: A navigation strategy with a benefit-cost ratio of 0.2 cannot continue to dictate the health of a multi-billion-dollar river recreation economy and an internationally recognized ecosystem. Federal policy must rebalance the equation, giving equal weight to natural resource protection, ecological resilience, and community economic value.
We are at the end of the 50-year band-aid era. The bathtubs are full, the floodplain forests are dying, and the backwaters are running out of time. Moving forward doesn't mean giving up on the river—it means having the courage to align policy with natural river mechanics, ensuring that the Upper Mississippi is managed not just as a commodity highway, but as a living, dynamic system for generations to come.
